Example of Undue CFR Influence
In Congress, CIA
For more Intel/Shadow government related info, visit <http://www.proparanoid.net/NWO.html>
Note: The following transcript is a matter of public
record (no copy permissions required), and details how openly the one-world
elitist groups such as CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) manipulate
governments and pull the strings of various intelligence communities. As
you read, compare what is said with my commentary, in footnotes. You decide
if this is undue influence from an outside body, or not. The entire transcript
follows, though only the first two-thirds express anything of concern to
the theme of this piece:
Hearing of The Commission On The Roles And Capabilities Of The United States Intelligence Community
Room SD-106 Dirksen
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Our next witness is Dr. Richard Haass, who currently is Director of National Security Programs and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
In fact, he has recently directed a study, a study run by a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations having to do with intelligence. He has had extensive Government experience, serving as Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council staff and in various Defense and State Department posts, and as a legislative aide in the Senate, and he has had also an academic career as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and lecturer in public policy at the Kennedy School.
We welcome him here today. He will be presenting some of the results of that task force at the council, but I think also some personal views of his own.
Please proceed, Dr. Haass.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD N. HAASS, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS ON THE STAFF OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; CURRENT DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND SENIOR FELLOW AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
DR. HAASS: Thank you, Dr. Brown. I very much appreciate this opportunity particularly to appear before you and several of my former friends.
DR. HAASS: Current friends and former colleagues -- I seem to have been more honest than perhaps I intended to be. I do appreciate this chance to be here today.
If I may echo what several of those who came before me had to say, you've all got an important responsibility here. If there is a clear need to reform U.S. intelligence, and I think there is, there's probably no less of a need to make sure that it is not fixed more than it is broke.
Intelligence remains a critical resource and tool, and its maintenance and improvement ought to be a national security priority of the United States.
Let me just say my own involvement with intelligence comes from three directions. To make clear my bona fides, such as they are, I spent over 10 years as a consumer of intelligence in various roles in the executive branch and also on the Hill. Secondly, I was a consultant to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department during the 1980's. And thirdly and most recently, I directed a project sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.
It was chaired by Hank Greenberg of American International Group, and consisted of around 25 people looking at the full gamut of issues on the future of U.S. intelligence. Our report will be published in a few weeks. (fn1)
It offers judgments and makes recommendations on a full range of issues, including the need for intelligence in the post-Cold War world, collection priorities in particular, the process of setting requirements, improving analysis, how to do that and how to increase its impact, economic intelligence, clandestine activities, organizational questions, military intelligence, the issues that Bill Barr just spoke about in detail, that is, the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement (fn1.1), and lastly, the question of oversight, be it by Congress or by others...
...The end of the Cold War, whatever else it has done, has not ushered in an age of peace and security, nor is the need for intelligence in any way eliminated by new sources of publicly available information.
There are still important but hard-to-learn facts about targets, including, for example, the intentions and capabilities of rogue states and terrorists (fn2), the proliferation of unconventional weapons, and the disposition of hostile or potentially hostile military forces, that can only be identified, monitored, and measured through dedicated intelligence assets.
When I am asked what is the principal finding
of our group , I say it is essentially just this, that despite the
end of the Cold War, despite the Internet, and despite Mr. Ames, there
is still a clear and strong need for an effective, in-house capability
within the U.S. Government to produce quality intelligence. (fn3)
1.1 Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of access to this text here - but ANY relationship between law enforcement and intelligence OUGHT NOT BE under ANY circumstances. However, a review of Political Control Technology <http://www.proparanoid.net/pnl.htm> will reveal an increasing evolution of not only an ancestral relationship between intelligence and law enforcement, but also, of military and law enforcement - especially in the area of mind control technology.
2 Dr. Haass testimony will involve the invoking terrorism concerns no less than seventeen times.
3 This is a necessary finding, since there are many
who would cut back the role of intelligence now that the cold war is over
-- seeking at the very least reasonable cuts in spending, or at the most,
the complete demise of CIA.
The ultimate purpose of U.S. intelligence is to enhance U.S. national security by informing policy makers and supporting military operations. Toward these ends, one of the most important functions of the intelligence community, but one that is often overlooked, is to provide analysis gleaned from all sources, open as well as closed or secret, and to package it in a manner that is timely and useful for policy makers (fn4).
Only the intelligence community performs this essential integrative function , and if it were not performed by the intelligence community, it would have to be performed elsewhere (fn5).
I would also say that the United States enjoys a position of unique power and, as a result, great opportunity in the post-Cold War world. Intelligence, not simply the knowing but the sharing of it (fn6), thus becomes an important tool.
5 Such as the corporate giants -- this is a hint of the same pressure applied when Truman was virtually forced by bankers and big business to found the CIA and its predecessor, OSS. These people are the same key players in the formation of CFR and similar groups.
6 With Globalist interests, perhaps? The CFR (along
with the Trilateral Commission
and Bilderbergers) is NOT concerned with nationalism, but Globalism,
and as such, favors a complete loss of US Sovereignty.
Intelligence enables others, be it friendly governments, alliances, and U.N. agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, to be more effective in dealing with common challenges. Many multilateral (fn7) efforts that we care about can only succeed if the United States possesses and then is willing to share the available intelligence.
As a result, intelligence can be a critical tool in this effort, almost expanding the capacity of others as a multiplier if you will, so long as, adequate safeguards can be built into the process in order to protect classified information (fn8).
8 Any and all such information would be classified
-- this is concealment of intent to share whatever the intelligence community
wishes to share -- outside of government oversight. This is, in fact,
a form of foreign policy dictation outside of the authority of intelligence.
The role of Agency is to collect intelligence for its PRIMARY client, the
Presidency. Through the NSC, the President may elect to allow SECONDARY
clients (other nations) to access SELECT intelligence. It is NOT
within the power of Agency to make such decisions, or to 'barter' secrets
with foreign powers without prior consultation and approval with the White
A second area I would like to touch on is how to improve analysis. The simple answer is that the best way to ensure high- quality analysis is to bring high-quality analysts into the process. Analysis would, of course, be improved by increasing the flow of talented people into the intelligence community from the outside.
For example, I would think that greater provision could and should be made for lateral and mid-career entry of such analysts, as well as for their short-term involvement in specific projects. Closer ties between universities and the intelligence community would be desirable in this regard.
On a personal note, I think it is one of the unfortunate legacies of the 1960's that somehow the intelligence community and the CIA in particular became unwelcome on so many campuses (fn8.1). To the extent that one can make it once again acceptable for people in academic departments to work closely with the intelligence community, I think that would be good for people on both sides of that relationship.
In addition, careerists in the intelligence community would benefit from greater opportunities to spend time in other government departments and also on the outside, for example, in businesses involved in commerce and finance (fn9).
Another way to improve analysis would be through competitive or redundant analysis. It needs to be carried out and conveyed to policy makers in those areas where being wrong can have major consequences.
Emphasis on long-term estimates of familiar subjects and broad trends, though, should be reduced, given the lack of consumer interest and the low comparative advantage of the intelligence community in this area (fn10).
Any such estimates, if they are done, should be short, written by individuals, and have sources identified where they lead to major conclusions. If they are done by groups, then areas of consensus and disagreement alike ought to be highlighted (fn11).
9 Outright in-place assets (careerists will not leave Agency even when moving on to other positions outside of it) within other government agencies, branches, academia, and business.
10 What? This is the area for which the intelligence community has been lambasted for incompetence. They did not see the Kuwait invasion coming. They did not see the fall of the Soviet Bloc. They did not see because it suited them not to see -- Globalist goals were better satisfied in ignorance. More of the same to follow, apparently -- perhaps because CIA will be spending more time at home taking care of domestic concerns (you and me.)
11 What? This is the way it is done, now. This is
Prioritization is a must. The highest priorities for U.S. intelligence collection and, in most cases, analysis for the foreseeable future can be identified.
If I were to list them, I would include, first, the status of nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. Second, developments in the principal rogue states: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Third, potential terrorism against U.S. targets in the U.S. and overseas (fn12). Fourth, unconventional weapons proliferation more broadly (fn13), and fifth, political and military developments in China.
13 What? CIA is one of the world's most aggressive
proliferators of weapons -- arms supplier for profit, often to both sides
of neighboring hostiles, and almost always illegally conducted against
official US policy. CIA designed Ingram Machine guns and exotic bomb making
technology of the BR Fox Company were exported to the Bahamas for mass
production and sales to any who might apply. American weapon technology
was traded/sold to Iran, Iraq, and others in Iran Contra and other black
operations on through the Gulf War. And so it goes, profiting not only
CIA, but the leadership of CFR and similar groups who control the companies
Other subjects could be added to this list. For example, for the period of 1996, one would add Bosnia to that list, or any other time U.S. forces were deployed abroad in large numbers. But it is an important that we have a short, manageable list of priorities. If we try to do everything everywhere, we are unlikely to do it well.
The danger of politicization, the potential for the intelligence community to distort information or judgment in order to please the political authorities of the day, is real, and obviously can never be eliminated if intelligence officials are involved, as they must be, in the policy process (fn14). The challenge, though, is to develop reasonable safeguards while permitting intelligence producers and policy making consumers to interact. Guarding against political pressure, guarding against parochialism is, in my way of thinking, a powerful argument for maintaining a strong, centralized capability, and not leaving decisions affecting important intelligence related questions solely to the policy making departments (fn15).
Unlike business, the customer is not always right (fn16)...
...The third critical subject I'd like to touch on briefly involves organizational questions. The position of the Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI, should be strengthened so that he can wield greater influence over the various components of the intelligence community (fn17).
15 Now we see that what he is really talking about (parochialism refers to the President) is the reduction of CIA controls over what CIA can do on its own. They are responsible to the President and Congress, but continually go off on their own as the 'pickle factory' and get into trouble. They don't like being reigned back, as their murder of Kennedy (see <http://www.proparanoid.net/jfk.htm> for CIA 'confession') suggests.
16 Government should let CIA do whatever it wants -- CIA knows best.
17 As we read on, we realize he wants to be able
to control other intelligence agencies, such as Defense Intelligence Agency
and other military agencies, NSA, and others, perhaps even FBI.
Greater centralization ought to allow for resource decisions that reflect national priorities, and not choices that would otherwise be driven by those who oversee, for example, the technical collection programs, or who are concerned simply with military programs. Such a centralized approach would create one person with a community-wide perspective and the ability to determine which systems and issues receive priority (fn17.1).
The intelligence community would, at least in principle, be more responsive to change if this were done. This can best, and most easily, be accomplished by bolstering the DCI in the current context, that is, with his two hats, both as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as the Director of Central Intelligence. He could be given the right to nominate and reject nominations to head other agencies (fn18). He could also be given the authority to determine budgets and to be able to move people and resources to respond to changing circumstances (fn19). Indeed, the result would be a DCI similar to what was planned nearly a half-century ago (fn20)....
...Closely related to this question of strengthening the DCI is the controversial matter of what might be called the growing militarization of American intelligence. There are grounds for concern about the influence exerted by the Defense Department and by defense-related concerns. There is a danger that spending on intelligence to support military operations will take priority over other important, or even vital, national security ends in which intelligence is needed (fn21).
18 Absolute power over other agencies through control of leadership - an ultimate form of in-place assets.
19 The job of Congress. While Congress has little actual control over current intelligence spending (because spending projects are concealed even from Congress by disguise as other needs), this would make far more convenient the process of funding any and all agency needs without oversight.
20 Envisioned by the Globalists who founded CIA, not by any government planners. Truman fought them tooth and nail on that issue, realizing that it put too much power into covert and uncountable hands.
21 This crying is over the increased budgetary allotments
to military intelligence during the Gulf War and Bosnia operations -- a
just situation which apparently threatens CIA's desire to be bigger and
more important than military intelligence -- and focus on home issues.
There is a related concern that the voice of the Defense Department will grow too strong, something which reflects the organizational reality that the Defense Department manages the large collection programs that consume a significant share of the resources that go to intelligence.
It is one thing for the bulk of the intelligence effort to be devoted to supporting military operations, but it's quite another thing for the Department of Defense to have a dominant voice in determining this allocation. For this reason, while reasons of efficiency might support the consolidation of a new agency devoted to imagery and mapping functions, I, for one, am not persuaded of the desirability of locating this new organization within the realm of defense (fn21.1).
The fourth area that I would like to highlight is the realm of clandestine operations. At the start, I would simply say that maintaining and enhancing clandestine capabilities takes time and resources, but that creating and nurturing this capability ought to be a high priority (fn22).
The most important function of the clandestine services is to collect human intelligence. As you know, such intelligence can complement other sources, and in certain instances it can be the principal or sole source of information. This tends to be especially true in closed societies, where decision-making and information is limited to a few, where highly valued efforts are meant to be kept secret, or where the targeted activity is not easily captured, by reconnaissance or by eavesdropping.
Human intelligence can also shed special understanding or light on intentions as well as capabilities. Such knowledge, for example, is likely to prove crucial in tracking the activities of terrorists or in determining the status of unconventional weapons programs (fn23).
22 It is precisely this area in which CIA becomes the errant 'pickle factory' and violates the law, policy, and moral expectations. They want more such behavior, not less.
23 So, he wants more spies -- closing with the specter
of terrorism should he not get them.
The capability to undertake these and other tasks, be it to frustrate a terrorist action, to intercept some technology or equipment that would help a rogue state or group build a nuclear device, or to assist some group to overthrow a leadership whose action threatened U.S. interests, would constitute an important tool, one that can provide policy makers a valuable alternative or complement to diplomacy, sanctions, and military intervention.
So in short, clandestine operations, whether they are for the purpose of collecting human intelligence, or whether they are for the purpose of carrying out covert operations, is terribly important.
Let me just add two other points on this. Firstly, I realize that the process of carrying out clandestine activities, for whatever set of purposes, will often require that the United States associate itself with individuals of what you might call unsavory reputations, people who have in some instances committed crimes. I would think this is akin to the tradition in law enforcement of using criminals to catch criminals.
This policy ought to be acceptable to the United States so long as the likely benefits of any such association outweigh the certain moral and political costs of the association, a calculation that probably ought not to be made simply by the individual in the field (fn24).
The only other word of caution I would add here, in addition to the obvious ones of ensuring legality, of maintaining sufficient control and oversight, is that any covert action must appear consistent with established U.S. policy, so that if it is discovered, if it does become known publicly, the purposes behind the effort would be more likely to be understood (fn25).
Clandestine operations, for whatever set of purposes, be it to collect intelligence, whether for counterintelligence or to carry out covert operations, are circumscribed, as you know, by a number of legal and policy constraints. I think these constraints deserve review to avoid diminishing the potential contribution of this instrument (fn26).
At a minimum, I would highlight two areas here. First,
a fresh look should be taken at the limits on the use of nonofficial covers
for hiding and protecting those involved in clandestine activities (fn27).
Second, rules that can prohibit preemptive attacks on terrorists or support
for individuals who are hoping to bring about regime change ought to be
25 He seems to be saying that he seeks to obey policy and remain within the law. Not so. Notice he said 'must appear consistent', which simply means it must have a cover operation. JFK was assassinated under cover of the Bay of Pigs, for example. But there is more. Read on.
26 He wants the constraints (policy and law) to be diminished, not the power to act restricted.
27 There are no limits on unofficial covers. An agent can pretend to be anyone under any guise. Perhaps he means that agents should be free to infiltrate other legitimate organizations without the knowledge of that organization -- so if your church sends missionaries abroad, the CIA should be allowed to piggy-back on your mission.
28 [from last word of last paragraph in part 1] He
wants the power to launch military raids on foreign soil without Congressional
or Presidential approval -- a power to commit acts of war at will.
I'd like to make one other point on the clandestine side, which is to simply say that obviously constant vigilance inside the CIA is needed. In this area, like anyone else who follows the subject at all, I am aware of the controversy. But I would also say that those in the Operations Directorate should know that risk-taking will be supported, and that they will be politically protected so long as what they do is authorized and legal under U.S. law. Such support, in my view, is crucial.
I would add a personal note here, that contrary to widespread impressions, one problem with the clandestine service has been a lack of initiative brought about by a fear of often retroactive discipline and a lack of high level support. This has to be rectified if the intelligence community is going to continue to produce human intelligence (fn29)...
...My final point concerns the future. As you, better than anyone, know, there's a great deal of reform-oriented activity taking place right now in the intelligence realm. It involves the intelligence community itself, it involves this commission, it involves congressional committees, and it involves groups such as the one I participated in (fn30).
In my view, there is a real need for follow-up and coordination. In some areas, I think there is need for additional work. Let me cite a few.
Most important is defense intelligence. There is a need for a clear division of labor here so that redundancies within the Department of Defense can be avoided. For example, the desirability of maintaining large service intelligence organizations is unclear. The services are charged with the mission of equipping and training their personnel, and any intelligence not tied to these specific service missions ought to be eliminated and located elsewhere (fn31).
30 An admission that CFR is an important player in reform of the intelligence community -- though it should not be, since it represents the interests of big business and other elitist power brokers who seek a one-world corporate-state government.
31 Another seeming attack on the military intelligence
groups and an attempt to usurp control. Eliminate the branch intelligence
agencies (ONI, Army Intelligence, etc.) and replace them with CIA, leaving
only DIA to fend for all of military's special needs.
Rationalizing defense intelligence and the roles of the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, commanders in the field, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is a task that a stronger DCI or the Secretary of Defense should undertake as an urgent priority.
I'd also cite the entire area of the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement as one that merits additional examination. In my view, foreign policy ought to normally take precedence over law enforcement overseas. As a result, FBI and DEA agents operating abroad should not be allowed to operate independently of the ambassador or the CIA, lest they risk causing major foreign policy problems or complicating ongoing intelligence efforts (fn32).
Having said this, I would simply reiterate my view that this is one of the areas that needs further analysis. There are also a few other candidates for follow-up work. One would be the PFIAB, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the possibility of recasting it along the lines of this commission so in a sense it is not simply the President's board but one that is responsible to Congress as well (fn33).
33 Reducing the power of the President over CIA --
probably a good thing if we want to eliminate Presidential assassinations
and power brokering to the point of election fraud. (NOTE: This was written
before the 'election' of George Bush over Al Gore in the questionable circumstances
surrounding the Florida debacle.)
Secondly, I think there's a case for considering the creation of an intelligence reserve that would support the DCI and the intelligence community for dealing with unanticipated crises in low priority areas.
It was, for example, impossible to know several years ago that U.S. forces would have been deployed in the mid-1990's to Rwanda, to Bosnia, to Somalia, to Haiti, and there is no way that the standing intelligence community can devote assets to every possible place where U.S. forces are going to have to go. The idea of creating some sort of an intelligence reserve is something that ought to be looked into (fn34).
A third area of possible reform involves the Congress itself, where perhaps the time has come to normalize the intelligence committees, rather than see them as something special and different (fn35).
35 He is trying to set the stage here for the next
few paragraphs which seek to ask the commission to recommend setting up
a Congressional committee to see that his recommendations and concerns
are represented within Congress.
I would end by suggesting there's one other need for continued work, and this stems from my concern that once this commission, once you all, go out of business, that we will have lost the best way to bring together the executive and Congress on the task of reforming intelligence. I say this not to please you here today, but out of a real concern that the momentum towards intelligence reform could well be lost.
As a result, I think there is a strong argument for the President, drawing on his principal advisors and working closely with the DCI and other members of the intelligence community, the bipartisan leadership of Congress, the members of this commission, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to consider establishing a steering group, if you will, a standing commission, to look at legislation and to propose reform and to see that it happens. Otherwise, I fear that the opportunity and the necessity to improve U.S. intelligence could well be lost.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Thank you very much, Dr. Haass...
...VICE CHAIRMAN RUDMAN: Let me ask you a second and a very brief question in the area of economic intelligence. Without getting into the general identities of people, were there any people on your task force who believed that U.S. intelligence should be used for the benefit of private corporations in not just a defensive way, but in an offensive way (fn36, 36.1).
36.1 Unstated here in the question, but revealed below, is that Rudman is himself a member of CFR and well aware of the answer to the question posed. In other words, the appearance is that he is playing shill and feeding Haass with questions predetermined to provide a forum for thought. The dice are loaded.
DR. HAASS: People came awfully close to thinking that it ought to, particularly people from the business community.
VICE CHAIRMAN RUDMAN: That is what I am really talking about.
DR. HAASS: It was one of the surprises for people such as myself, whose career is more governmental or academic. But it bordered on what I would almost call a neo-mercantilist approach, in which intelligence became a tool of American corporate activity. (fn36.2)
It always struck me as ironic that those who had access to intelligence throughout their careers were more skeptical. And those who had not had access seemed to think intelligence was this great treasure that, if only they had more, their profit lines would go up (fn37).
VICE CHAIRMAN RUDMAN: I think there is probably unanimity on this panel on that narrow part of that subject, that that is a slippery slope.
DR. HAASS: And people also recognize that it is harder
and harder to say what an American firm is nowadays and so forth (fn38).
37 Which would explain why CFR has such an interest in fomenting intelligence community policy change.
38 Because corporations are becoming globalist in nature (partnerships, ownerships, and business placements), rather than nationalistic. The trend for megamergers is between partners on foreign soil. More and more international wealth is being consolidated into fewer and fewer players. Eventually, we may see a final 'TerraCorp'.
END OF COMMENTARY
VICE CHAIRMAN RUDMAN: Exactly.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, it is worse than a slippery slope. It is a ravine.
VICE CHAIRMAN RUDMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Yes, Mr. Harrington.
MR. HARRINGTON: Mr. Haass, did your working group consider the mundane question of whether or not the amount of the defense budget -- I mean of the intelligence budget -- and to what extent it might be made public?
DR. HAASS: We did consider the question of public knowledge of the budget. Generally, we came out thinking that the overall number could probably be made public. Possibly, several subsidiary numbers could be made public, but not too many. And we are back to slippery slopes and possibly ravines again.
And I think the general feeling was that while people seem to want that information, the bottom lines, it is not clear that it does them an awful lot of good to know that the intelligence community, overall, spends $30 billion, $27 billion, whatever the latest numbers are. I am not sure that necessarily helps you a lot.
On the other hand, it does give you some scale of effort. And I think people felt that those kinds of broad numbers could probably be safely let out. The question was where and, more importantly, how you hold the line once you had begun that process.
I remember a conversation I had with Les Aspin on this right when we were beginning our effort and you were all beginning the effort here. A journalist came up to him and asked him the same question. And he said, Oh, I would have no problem with agreeing to the overall number. And then the journalist said, Well, what about the next number, and what about the next? And Les said, Gee, if I knew you were going to ask me those questions, I probably would not have agreed to the first. And I think that is the concern of people with this.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Thank you...
SENATOR EXON: Mr. Chairman, if you would let me make a few brief remarks with regards to the excellent work that I think you members of the group have done . (fn39) I unfortunately cannot control my time here. And obviously, again today, when I would have liked to have spent more time with you, other things do interfere with it.
I have followed very closely the hearing through Andy Johnson, my staff person, who has been at all of the meetings. He has kept me fully posted. (fn 40)
I want to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, and my former colleague in the United States Senate, and before him, Les Aspin, for being excellent leaders in this field. I am anxious to move forward in implementing the recommendations that will finally be made by the Commission. And from the review that I have made of the information given to me by Mr. Johnson, I think you are exactly on track . And I have served on other committees, usually being more involved than I have been on this one -- unfortunately not possible because of my other duties.
I just think your whole approach to this has been extremely professional, and a lot of good is going to come out of this because of your dedication, of which I have not been as much a part as I would like to have been. So, from a member of the Commission that has not been as active as I would like to have been, I say thank you for an excellent effort. And all of you who have put in so very much time on this are to be congratulated for the sacrifice of your time and your talents to this very, very important matter.
I only have a question or two of the current witness, who is particularly interesting because of his long service on the National Security Council primarily, and elsewhere. I noticed in your testimony you say there are still important but hard to learn facts about targets, including the intentions and capabilities of rogue states and terrorists and so forth and so on.
I happen to feel, and I suppose you have talked about this when I was not here today, but I happen to feel that the intelligence-gathering services probably are under more of a strain, particularly with regard to terrorist activities, which I am fearful is going to require a great deal more intelligence in the field that probably we have not been as much involved in as we are going to have to be in the future as a result of the Cold War coming to an end.
I would say that as a consumer of much of this information and as a senior member of the Armed Services Committee, in looking back at some of the information that we received, especially with regard to the economic situation in the Soviet Union, was far from what I think the facts were at the time. I also noticed in your testimony that you indirectly touch on some of these things by talking about things, making sure that the collector of intelligence information does not become the purveyor of information to the political structure, to have them hear what they would like to hear.
And I unfortunately think that, you know, not by design, but maybe by just the process that we were using at the time, that we were not getting all of the -- I felt much better, frankly, in looking back, about the hard information that we had on intelligent matters. I mean, I want to be a little bit guarded, but I mean what we knew as to where the key people were and what they were doing and so forth and so on. I thought we had good intelligence on that.
I never thought, looking back, that we had very good intelligence with regard to the economic difficulties that do play in a situation as to guarding the -- trying to guard the information that we have and assess it, as to what we are going to be doing in the future.
I happen to feel -- and I would maybe, before I ask the witness to comment on this, to have probably some comment to bring me up to date by Mr. Brown and Mr. Rudman with regards to whether or not you think we have done an adequate job. Or should we be doing more with regard to the collection of and disposition of the information with regard to terrorists, which I think is a tremendously important challenge to the Intelligence Community.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Well, it is something that we have looked at. It is a very tough nut to crack in many cases. The priority has certainly been greatly increased. Success has been mixed. And of course, the more successful you are, the less you tend to say about it.
I think we have a ways to go.
40. In other words, Senator Exon is also a CFR member.
VICE CHAIRMAN RUDMAN: I would agree with that. And, frankly, I think that the whole area of intelligence on terrorism is really a fledgling activity, even though we have been at it for a while. It is certainly not at the level of maturity as doing a study of order of battle from a particular country and a particular region. It is not that empirical. It is very difficult.
But I do think that you will find in the final version of the report, as we are still evolving, that there will be some time devoted to improving collection generally.
SENATOR EXON: How do you feel about all this, Mr. Haass? Given your past experience, I am sure that terrorist-type of activities were something that you were briefed on from time to time. But do you agree that this is an important new challenge -- probably the most difficult one -- for the Intelligence Community?
DR. HAASS: Senator, it is on anyone's short list, not simply of ongoing foreign policy problems, but one of those problems where intelligence can possibly make a unique contribution. We are not going to learn about terrorists on the Internet. We are not going to learn about terrorists on CNN until it is too late.
So if there is a chance of learning about them, it is probably going to come from intelligence sources -- most likely human sources -- and not from satellites. And if there is a chance of doing anything about them, it is going to be, I think, largely through covert methods.
It is part and parcel of a larger phenomenon in the post-Cold War world, where we are not going to have the luxury of focusing so much on a much more conventional, traditional threat called the Soviet Union, and we are going to have to focus much more on a number of very different kinds of threats. Terrorism is obviously high on that list.
And I would think that when you look out over the next 5, 10, 15 years, and consider a reorientation of resources within the intelligence budget, that is one of the pots that is going to receive more rather than less. It is also one of the reasons that you are unlikely, when all is said and done, to have some large peace dividend in this area. There are just going to be new requirements, like terrorism, that are going to come along, and they are not going to be inexpensive to deal with.
SENATOR EXON: I notice in your prepared material that you did have some comment about the necessity of human sources. You also said in your testimony that when you get into human sources, not uncommonly, you find yourself very close to some unsavory characters. But I suspect that the unsavory characters are the ones that we are likely going to have to go to, to depend on getting some information that could probably come through no other source, including ones that you have mentioned.
DR. HAASS: The sorts of people who would join the organization, such as terrorist cells that you are talking about, are unlikely to be paid-up members of the Boy Scouts. And I think part of the debate that we began to have publicly in this country several months ago -- the controversy about Guatemala and so forth -- was just the tip of the iceberg.
And I think it raised, more than illuminated, shall we say, some of the difficult choices that we are going to have to make about what are going to be the ground rules or guidelines for associations with these people. Because if we deny ourselves that flexibility, if we say we are not going to associate with these people who have committed human rights crimes or what have you, we are also going to deny ourselves access to the very people who either are going to commit terrorism or going to be in a position to know about terrorists and other sorts of concerns of ours.
SENATOR EXON: I guess what you are saying is, if I were placed in the position where I was the one seeking that kind of information, I would have to associate with someone like Warren Rudman, whether I wanted to or not?
SENATOR EXON: Is that the message you are trying to deliver here?
DR. HAASS: That is senatorial privilege I think, which I do not enjoy.
SENATOR EXON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I thank the witness.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: Thank you.
VICE CHAIRMAN RUDMAN: I want to just say one other thing to the witness before he leaves. You made an interesting comment about an ongoing process here. You should be aware -- and I guess this is a good time to say it -- and the Commission has said this before, but it has not got much publicity -- we intend not only just to issue a report -- there will be a legislative package and there will be a package involving executive orders. I mean, we are going to tell people what we think they ought to do and how they ought to do it. (fn 41) And then, of course, the Congress will decide, along with the Administration, what they will do.
So we intend to really put it together, in terms of what recommendations we do make. So they simply do not drift off, waiting for someone to put something together. And we will do that.
DR. HAASS: I think that is great. My only concern was, with what you were saying, and with a very energetic gentleman who is currently the DCI, and with two very active and involved congressional committees, and with the inevitable differences that are going to arise among the various centers of power and influence here, that all this did not result in some sort of gridlock and necessary things did not happen.
And I am just hoping that -- I realize you do not want to necessarily make this a career -- that there will be continuing effort to work with Senator Specter, with Congressman Combest, with others, so the inevitable differences do not get in the way of what I hope are the common areas, where people do agree that reform can and should be made.
CHAIRMAN BROWN: I think you can count on a continued interest on the part of many of us. I do not think that it is feasible to set up some group that becomes the referee. You know better than that.
Thank you very much for your thought and the use of your experience. I think it has been very helpful.
DR. HAASS: Thank you.
His use of 'We intend...' proves his loyalties to the CFR, not to his constituents or any Congressional duty. 'And the Commission has said this before...' proves it is an ongoing process of influence. '...there will be a legislative package and there will be a package involving executive orders.' proves it has all been arranged already, awaiting only the mere formalities of hearings and paperwork - and that it involves not only active participation of a CFR obedient Congress, but also the Presidency and other key parties. Such arrangements easily obtainable when the President, members of the NSC, and key Congressional members and committee heads are also members of the CFR and their sister organizations.
Given that virtually every important government on earth is similarly infected with some kind of CFR cabal, all of which work closely with each other in determining the future of the earth as they wish it to be, the question for the reader to ponder is this: What need of spies and armies have we if our governments have already been overthrown from within? What is the true purpose of wars and arms races if they are spawned by the guidance of the same central force from within the opposing combatant governments? The answer? Follow the money, which always flows back to the leaders of CFR and the like... and know that if a people are distracted by such as wars and political intrigues, they are less likely to focus on the true nature and workings of their own government and those who influence it.
Contact The Professional Paranoid: Updated 7/2000